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Abstract: The scenarios generated by energy systems models provide a picture of the range of
possible pathways to a low-carbon future. However, in order to be truly useful, these scenarios
should not only be possible but also plausible. In this paper, we have used lessons from historical
energy transitions to create a set of diagnostic tests to assess the feasibility of an example 2 ◦C scenario
(generated using the least cost optimization model, TIAM-Grantham). The key assessment criteria
included the rate of deployment of low carbon technologies and the rate of transition between primary
energy resources. The rates of deployment of key low-carbon technologies were found to exceed the
maximum historically observed rate of deployment of 20% per annum. When constraints were added
to limit the scenario to within historically observed rates of change, the model no longer solved for
2 ◦C. Under these constraints, the lowest median 2100 temperature change for which a solution was
found was about 2.1 ◦C and at more than double the cumulative cost of the unconstrained scenario.
The analysis in this paper highlights the considerable challenge of meeting 2 ◦C, requiring rates of
energy supply technology deployment and rates of declines in fossil fuels which are unprecedented.
Keywords: energy transition; energy systems modelling; low-carbon; decarbonisation
1. Introduction
Most of the mitigation scenarios developed by the scientific community, as presented and
discussed, for example, in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s fifth assessment
report [1], use energy systems models (which, as part of integrated assessment models, are often
combined with modules that calculate the climate impact of greenhouse gas emissions). These models
most commonly operate by selecting a cost minimising (or welfare-maximising) mixture of energy
extraction, transformation, distribution and end-use technologies which fulfil current and future
requirements for energy services (such as heating, lighting, transport and industrial process energy
inputs) either with or without exogenously-imposed emissions or temperature change constraints.
The models hold great sway in describing: (a) plausible futures for the fuel and technology mix in
energy systems; (b) how these systems will transition from their current state to future, often very
low-carbon or even net carbon-negative states; and (c) what the cost of the transition might be.
Although these scenarios are not intended to be forecasts of the future, they should nevertheless
be stress-tested with regard to their feasibility, in order to ensure that they present a genuinely
credible range of how energy systems might transition in reference (no climate policy) and low-carbon
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scenarios. Specifically, stress-tests might consider the rate of transition of energy systems at a high
level (for example in terms of their use of different primary energy resources, their change in energy
intensity improvement rate), as well as the rate of deployment of particular low-carbon technologies,
and how these transitions compare to past experiences. History clearly cannot be treated as a strict
guide or bound on the future, which may be subject to a number of different contextual (economic,
technological, political, social) factors. Nevertheless, analysis of past energy transitions provides a set
of interesting “stylised facts” (a term coined originally to describe general empirical findings about
economic growth [2]) about the rate of transition between different primary energy resources and the
rate and pattern of take-up of energy technologies, so as to provide an important benchmark against
which the plausibility of future energy transitions may be assessed.
A matrix of factors to help assess the degree of challenge involved in achieving a range of
deep decarbonisation pathways was presented in a previous report by the authors on mitigation [3].
This study builds on that analysis by first exploring the methods used to apply insights from historical
energy transitions to future low-carbon scenarios, and then applying these methods in order to
assess—and where necessary adjust—a central mitigation scenario from an integrated assessment
model (TIAM-Grantham [4,5]) developed as part of the AVOID 2 study [6] into the implications of
meeting different long-term temperature goals. Typically this results in an increase in the lowest
temperatures that can be reached by the models.
This paper is set out as follows: Section 2 first provides a brief review of the energy transitions
literature in order to set out what insights from past energy transitions have been applied to future
scenarios; Section 3 describes the discussions and outcomes of a workshop held in October 2014,
bringing together energy researchers across a range of institutions to discuss what lessons and insights
can be gained from past transitions; Section 4 describes how the insights from Sections 2 and 3 are
applied to a mitigation scenario in order to assess its feasibility; Section 5 presents the results of this
analysis; Section 6 concludes our presentation.
2. Insights from the Energy Transitions Literature
2.1. What do Low-Carbon Scenarios Imply in Terms of Energy System Changes?
One way of assessing the scale of the transition in future energy scenarios is to consider the
make-up of primary energy demand when comparing future reference (i.e., without climate policy)
and mitigation scenarios to current and historical periods of energy use. For example Figure 1 shows
that in a reference case with no mitigation action, fossil fuels would continue to dominate primary
energy use in the next 40 years. However, the 2050 mitigation scenarios (with Greenhouse Gas, GHG,
atmospheric stabilisation levels of 550 and 450 ppm CO2e) see a marked shift towards biomass, other
renewables and carbon capture and storage (CCS). This analysis highlights a) the dramatic increase in
the share of low- or zero-emitting energy resources to 2050, from about 10% in 2010 to 50% or more in
the 450 ppm scenarios, and b) the large differences in future primary energy mix when comparing
different models (WITCH [7] and MESSAGE [8–10]) which have differences in assumptions on key
parameters such as technology costs, fossil fuel supply costs, the availability of storage capacity for
captured CO2 and the level and rate of change of future energy demand and intensity.
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Figure 1. Historical, current, and projected mix of global primary energy at 40 year intervals.  
Notes: 1890–1970 data from Smil (2010) [11], 2010 data from IEA (2012) [12], 2050 data from Ampere 
project inter-model comparison (from IPCC AR5 scenario database). 
Some studies have highlighted the key technology deployment rates which drive this shift from 
unabated coal, oil and gas to a much broader mix of energy resources.  
• Eom et al. [13] show that, in a 450 ppm scenario, a quadrupling in the share of low-carbon energy 
in the period 2030–2050 (following relatively weak regional mitigation action up to 2030) could 
entail the deployment of 29–107 nuclear power plants globally every year (the upper end would 
occur in a case where there is no CCS). The lower end is in line with the highest rates achieved 
in the 1980s, but the high end is “unprecedented”. Solar deployment would increase by 50 to  
360 times the 2011 capacity deployment rate of 3–4 GW (again, the high end occurring where no 
CCS were allowed) although it should be noted that more recent solar deployment rates have 
been in the tens of GW.  
• Van der Zwaan et al. [14] also show that, across integrated assessment models (IAMs) in a 
scenario which has weak regional climate policies to 2020 and then global coordinated action 
aimed at achieving a 450 ppm atmospheric stabilisation of GHGs, there would be a very rapid 
ramp-up of low-carbon technologies, at rates (in terms of absolute GW deployed per year) far 
higher than have been achieved in recent history. This includes solar and wind deployment rates 
averaging around 150 GW per year in the period 2030–2050, compared to a few tens of GW per 
year to date. 
The comparison of absolute deployment rates of energy technologies in future low-carbon 
scenarios with historical absolute deployment rates of these or other technologies must be treated 
with caution, however, as future deployment will occur in the context of a growing energy system—
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amounts of finance, skills, supply chains and infrastructure. As such, normalising over temporal and 
spatial scales is important to ensure that comparisons between future and historical examples are 
valid. Such normalisation is discussed and applied in Sections 2.2 and 5 respectively.  
It should also be noted that the analysis of Van der Zwaan et al. [14] does not judge future rates 
of technology deployment to be feasible or infeasible based on physical limits to, e.g., fossil fuel, 
uranium, renewable (wind, solar insolation), water, land or other resources (as for example in 
MacKay’s analysis of possible UK decarbonisation choices [15]). The science of accounting for much 
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• Eom et al. [13] show that, in a 450 ppm scenario, a quadrupling in the share of low-carbon energy
in the period 2030–2050 (following relatively weak regional mitigation action up to 2030) could
entail the deployment of 29–107 nuclear power plants globally every year (the upper end would
occur in a case where there is no CCS). The lower end is in line with the highest rates achieved
in the 1980s, but the high end is “unprecedented”. Solar deployment would increase by 50 to
360 times the 2011 capacity deployment rate of 3–4 GW (again, the high end occurring where no
CCS were allowed) although it should be noted that more recent solar deployment rates have
been in the tens of GW.
• Van der Zwaan et al. [14] also show that, across integrated assessment models (IAMs) in a scenario
which has weak regional climate policies to 2020 and then global coordinated action aimed at
achieving a 450 ppm atmospheric stabilisation of GHGs, there would be a very rapid ramp-up of
low-carbon technologies, at rates (in terms of absolute GW deployed per year) far higher than
have been achieved in recent history. This includes solar and wind deployment rates averaging
around 150 GW per year in the period 2030–2050, compared to a few tens of GW per year to date.
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of possible UK decarbonisation choices [15]). The science of accounting for much broader factors
on future scenario feasibility is in its infancy and although integrated assessment models generally
contain bounds on energy resources, this area is ripe for further research.
2.2. How Feasible Are Such Energy System Changes?
The IPCC’s fifth assessment report [1] states that, “on the question of whether the [mitigation]
pathways are feasible, integrated models can inform this question by providing relevant information
such as rates of deployment of energy technologies, economic costs, finance transfers between regions
and links to policy objectives (energy security, energy prices). However, these models cannot determine
feasibility in an absolute sense. Scenario infeasibility often arises from pushing models beyond the
bounds they were designed to explore, but this doesn’t mean the scenario cannot be achieved—different
models have different feasibility limits”.
Riahi et al. [16] discuss such feasibility limits as being reached when a particular model cannot
find a solution to a mitigation constraint, as a result of: lack of mitigation options; binding constraints
for the diffusion of technologies; extremely high price signals (such as rapid increases in carbon prices).
They go on to caution that these feasibility limits concern technical and economic issues, and must be
strictly differentiated from the feasibility of a low-carbon transformation in the real world, which also
depends on a number of other factors such as political and social concerns (which might typically slow
transitions, although in certain cases—for example where specific pollution control regulations are
introduced—may lead to very rapid changes). These views were also reflected by Iyer et al. [17] and
Anderson and Bows [18].
An important question that arises from Riahi et al’s [16] assertion on feasibility limits is what
binding constraints might be imposed on models in order that they do not produce infeasible scenarios,
or alternatively how scenarios should be assessed in order to determine their feasibility. At an aggregate
level it is worth considering the speed with which the primary energy mix transitions over time. Table 1
summarises Smil’s [11] assessment of the time taken for coal, oil and gas to increase from a relatively
small share (5%) to much larger shares of total primary energy in the past, identifying an increasing
length of time for successive new fuels. Individual sectoral and service energy transitions tend to occur
over long periods of time (from 40 to 130 years), while aggregate energy system transitions can take
considerably longer [19]. Gruebler [20] observes that rates of transition (away from coal and biomass to
oil, gas and electricity) have slowed down markedly since the mid-1970s. Gruebler [20] attributes the
relatively slow rate of change for aggregate energy system indicators such as primary energy shares
to scale (larger systems change more slowly), infrastructure intensiveness, as well as technological
interrelatedness and complexity. Technology diffusion involves experimentation of many designs,
scaling up of those designs, scaling up of industries, and globalisation of industries. These processes
take many decades.
Table 1. Time for coal, oil and gas to achieve given shares of total global energy supply [11].
Fuel 5%→25% Global Share
Coal 35 years
Oil 40 years
Gas 55 years
Kramer and Haigh [21] analyse the historical shares of a range of fuels in the primary energy mix,
and assert that there are two stages or “laws” of energy technology development. In the first stage,
when a technology is new, it undergoes exponential growth (26% per year, or an order of magnitude
per decade) for a few decades, until it reaches “materiality” (around 1% of global energy). At this
point, growth becomes linear at 2%–4%/year, with the main barrier being that further penetration
can generally only occur at the rate at which existing energy technologies require replacement.
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Höök et al. [22] tend to agree with this relatively conservative view, noting that in the case of oil,
coal and gas, growth rates tend to decline with increasing output.
Iyer et al. [17] survey the historical average annual growth rates of a range of technologies and
products and use these rates to constrain future low-carbon technology growth rates (at three levels:
5% per year, 10% per year and 15% per year) in an integrated assessment model (called GCAM).
They show that if all major low-carbon energy technologies (bioenergy, renewables, CCS, nuclear)
are constrained at growth rates of 5% per year each, then a 450 ppm scenario starting with global
mitigation action from 2020 (“no delay”) is not feasible. If growth rates for these technologies are
constrained at 10% per year each, then the 450 ppm scenario is feasible, but only if action begins in 2020
or earlier. A delay of 10 years or more before coordinated mitigation action begins (during which time
the scenario follows an unmitigated baseline) would render the target infeasible, whereas allowing
higher growth rates of up to 15% per year would allow the target to be met even with a 30 year delay to
2050, albeit with higher costs. In order to justify their choice of growth rate caps, Iyer et al. [17] collate
estimates of historical growth rates for a number of technologies (although they do not state over what
period, or how long a period, these growth rates have been averaged). Whilst some transitions have
been modestly paced (e.g., global railway expansion at 4% per year, others have been more rapid
(natural gas power at 7% per year). Notably rapid transitions of low-carbon technologies include global
nuclear energy (11% average growth per year), Danish wind energy (20% per year) as well as flue
gas desulphurisation technologies in the US (15% per year). In the case of Danish wind, government
policies in the wake of the 1970s oil crisis, as well as opposition to nuclear power, focused efforts on
this technology (building on Denmark’s long-standing experience in wind energy developed over the
20th century). Some rapid energy transition examples are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Rate of growth of technologies and energy resources in rapid energy transition examples.
Country Technology/Fuel Rate of Growth
France Nuclear (PWR) 19% per year (1977–1997), maximum rate 9 GW per year (1980)
Denmark Wind 20% per year (1977–2008)
Netherlands Natural gas 5% of primary energy in 1965 to 50% in 1971
A different approach is taken by Wilson et al. [23] who fit “S-curves” to historical deployment
rates over the full lifecycle of an energy technology in order to assess the length of time taken for
each technology to increase from 10% to 90% of its eventual long-term saturation level expressed as
the maximum cumulative capacity installed. They also fit these curves to combined historical data
and projections for the deployment of various low-carbon technologies, taken from eight different
scenarios ranging from baseline to 480 ppm CO2e scenarios. To control for differences in the size of
the energy system into which technologies were diffusing historically and in future scenarios, they
normalise the capacity data by an indicator of overall system size (total primary energy). Their analysis
suggests that the time taken for a number of historical and current energy technologies to reach a given
extent of deployment is similar to or less than the time needed for low-carbon technologies such as
solar photovoltaic (PV), fossil CCS and wind to achieve the same extent. Wilson et al. [23] suggest that
the energy technology model used to produce the projections (in this case MESSAGE) may be either
parametrically and/or structurally conservative in that it has in-built diffusion constraints, and also
prefers to deploy a portfolio of low-carbon technologies concurrently, as opposed to successive waves of
dominant technologies as has been observed historically. The analytical approach of Wilson et al. [23]
is distinctive both in controlling for differences in system size over time, and in focusing on the full
lifecycle of technology deployment as opposed to maximum or rapid short-term increases in growth
rates (which could also occur within a longer timescale of more gradual deployment).
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2.3. What Are the Drivers, Barriers and Challenges of Rapid Energy Transitions?
Studies on specific energy-technology transitions, including Danish wind [24], Brazilian
ethanol [25,26], French nuclear [27], Dutch natural gas [11] and the replacement of town gas with
natural gas in the UK [28] all tend to point towards a high degree of state involvement, either through
direct coordination of activities or through the imposition of explicit regulations which direct market
activities. The 15% per year take-up of flue-gas desulphurisation provides a relevant example of a
pollution control technology deployed at rapid pace as a result of specific regulations [17].
A number of challenges to rapid technology take-up (and therefore energy system transition)
have been identified, including:
• stranded capital assets such as coal-fired power stations [29,30];
• lock-in of industry actors to existing “regimes” through their technical base knowledge, core
beliefs, mission, and industry-specific regulations [31];
• the additional investment needs for a low-carbon transition [29,32];
• significant infrastructure, land and storage requirements for low-carbon energy technologies like
CCS and renewables [33];
• the importance and challenge of achieving rapid penetration of energy efficient end-use
technologies [20]; particularly given the potential for significant rebound effects [34];
• the lack of co-benefits (such as greater portability, quality, reliability ease of use),of many
low-carbon technologies which would offset their increased cost, at least without a carbon price
or other incentives [19].
It is important to note that quantitative energy systems models, such as the model presented in
this paper, typically have limited capability to represent these barriers. Furthermore, the barriers to
energy systems transitions can often be the result of complex interaction of factors (such as social,
cultural, political and economic factors), which cannot be taken in isolation. There is a growing set of
models known as socio-technical energy transition (STET) models which aim to address this issue, as
reviewed by Li et al. [35]. In particular, these models aim to provide valuable insights by capturing
the interaction with and impact of these factors on the feasibility of energy transitions. However, the
multi-disciplinary nature of these STET models means that they face an inherent trade-off between
detail and complexity. Geels et al. [36] highlights that these analytical approaches (i.e., conventional
quantitative energy models vs. STETs) are “characterised by fundamental differences in philosophies
of science and ontological assumptions” and calls for “bridging between the different approaches to
generate deeper assessments of low-carbon transitions”. One suggestion is to iteratively link qualitative
narratives or “storylines” with models as presented by Trutnevyte et al. [37]. This paper provides
another approach in which historical transitions are used to generate feasibility criteria which inform
constraints in a quantitative model and model outputs are tested against these same criteria.
3. Background and Outcomes of Energy Transitions Workshop
To supplement the literature review presented in Section 2, a workshop of energy researchers
from across the UK (as well two representatives from the EU) was convened in October 2014, followed
by a post-workshop questionnaire, to gain further insights into which factors are most relevant to
assessing future low-carbon scenario feasibility. Specifically, the workshop and questionnaire explored
the following topics:
• What are the most important factors to consider when assessing the feasibility of low-carbon
scenarios?
• How can we achieve radical emissions reductions?
• Participants’ views on technology deployment and energy efficiency improvement rates in recent
low-carbon scenarios.
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Workshop attendees, a summary note of the workshop and the post-workshop questionnaire
are set out in Appendixs A and B, respectively. Detailed questionnaire responses are provided as
supplementary material. The following sub-sections present the main insights that emerged from
the workshop and questionnaire responses, and how these were incorporated into the analytical
framework set out in Sections 4 and 5.
3.1. Views on the Most Important Factors to Consider for Assessing Technology Penetration Rates
During the workshop, attendees identified several factors of relevance to assessing the feasibility
of particular energy technology deployment rates in low-carbon scenarios:
a. Degree to which there has been a ramp-up “tail” period before rapid deployment
b. Co-benefits of the technology beyond low-carbon
c. Cost reduction potential of technology
d. Lead-time to build and deploy technology
e. Availability of complementary or supporting technologies/infrastructure
f. Deployment of other low-carbon technologies which compete for resources
g. Capital-intensiveness of technology
h. Lifetime of technology
The questionnaire asked respondents to rank the four most important of these factors by level of
importance, as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Number of respondents identifying each factor (with relative importance ranking) for
assessing the feasibility of technology deployment rates in low-carbon scenarios.
Four factors stand out as being most important: availability of supporting technologies and
infrastructure; time taken for a ramp-up “tail” before rapid deployment; lead time to build technology;
and potential cost reductions (learning rates). In addition to these factors, respondents also identified a
number of other factors such as consumer behaviour, cultural factors, the policy context, skills and
supply chains, as well as complementarities and trade-offs between technologies.
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3.2. Views on the Most Important Factors to Consider When Assessing Energy System Transitions
The workshop and questionnaire also explored the factors by which overall energy system
(rather than individual technology) transitions might be assessed. Three factors (level of carbon price,
rate of increase of carbon price, as well as time taken historically for energy sources to achieve a given
share of total primary energy), which have been used in the literature as indicators of the degree of
system change, were presented to respondents in order to elicit views on their usefulness. On a scale
of 1 (not at all useful) to 5 (very useful) respondents returned an average score of 3.27 (historical rate of
share increase), 3.27 (rate of carbon price increase) and 3.18 (absolute level of carbon price), indicating
that these three factors were all felt to be fairly useful indicators.
3.3. Views on Rates of Supply-Side Technology Deployment and Energy Efficiency Change
In both the workshop and questionnaire, participants were asked to discuss the feasibility of a
number of technology (nuclear, CCS, solar PV and wind) take-up rates in major world regions from
modelled scenarios in the recent Ampere study [16], taken from the IPCC’s AR5 database [38] , as
shown in Appendix B. Energy intensity improvements for the transport, buildings and industry sectors
were also presented. Appendix A summarises responses from the workshop, whilst a summary of
responses from the questionnaire is provided in the supplementary material.
In general experts felt that the technology take-up rates appeared feasible for wind and solar PV
technologies (provided that grid integration issues could be managed), even though these have very
high growth rates during some periods. For nuclear and CCS, however, views reflected concerns that
sudden kinks in growth rates, or the sudden appearance of technologies at large capacity deployment
levels, would be unrealistic, reflecting the need to have some form of ramp-up period before rapid
deployment ensues.
The experts considered that the energy intensity improvements presented could be feasible, but
with the caveat that it is not easy to judge overall sectoral energy intensity improvements without the
underlying reasons for these (including fuel switching, technology efficiency improvements, demand
responses and so on).
3.4. Summary of Insights from Workshop
Whilst a variety of views were expressed in the workshop and follow-up questionnaire, experts
felt overall that assessing model scenario feasibility by considering energy system transitions
(including technology take-up rates and changing energy shares) in light of historical benchmarks can
be insightful.
Of the particular factors identified as particularly important when considering the feasibility
of technology deployment scenarios, some (infrastructure, lead times to build technology) are not
explicitly modelled in most energy models, whereas one (cost reduction potential) forms an input into
many of the models (as is the is the case with the TIAM-Grantham model used here), which choose
low-carbon technologies based on their relative cost.
As such, key insights from the workshop which are used as input into the assessment of
low-carbon scenarios in this study are the degree to which there is a ramp-up period for technologies
before they are rapidly deployed, as well as the maximum rate at which those technologies are then
deployed, with reference to historical maximum technology deployment rates. In addition, rates of
change of particular energy sources as a share of total primary energy are compared to historical
benchmarks to assess future scenarios. Sections 4 and 5 describe how particular historical growth rates
of technologies, as well as shares of primary sources of energy, have been analysed and used to assess
and adjust future low-carbon scenarios.
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4. Methods to Apply Insights from Energy Transitions Analysis
4.1. Description of Analytical Methods
The historical energy transitions literature, and those efforts to use lessons from history to inform
scenarios of future energy systems transformation, highlight a number of areas to explore in order to
assess the real-world feasibility of these scenarios. Three key questions have been identified as worthy
of further exploration when assessing and adjusting low-carbon scenarios:
• How rapidly are particular energy technologies deployed in low-carbon scenarios and how do
these deployment rates compare to historical levels of energy technology deployment?
• What is the pattern of energy technology deployment in low-carbon scenarios, particularly with
respect to the initial ramp-up period (formative phase), and how does this compare to past
technology deployment patterns?
• What is the overall rate of transition between primary energy resources in future low-carbon
scenarios, and how does this compare to history?
Drawing on approaches used in the literature, we use six diagnostic tests (summarised in
Table 3) to address these questions. These tests assess the rates and patterns of both individual
energy technology changes and overall energy system changes and compare them to past trends in
order to help evaluate whether the projected energy transitions seem feasible. These tests are not
completely independent of each other but they provide insights at different levels and perspectives,
from deployment profiles at an individual technology level (Test 4) to deployment within the context
of the whole energy system (Tests 5 and 6). This paper builds on similar studies in the literature
(e.g., Sluisveld et al. [39]) in two key ways: (1) it combines the tests into stepwise diagnostic approach
and (2) it applies this diagnostic tool to successively constrain the model to generate scenarios that do
not break certain feasibility criteria.
Table 3. Proposed tests to assess the feasibility of low-carbon scenarios.
Area of Assessment Description of Test Previous Uses of Test
How rapidly are
low-carbon technologies
deployed?
Test 1: Comparison of future low-carbon technology
growth rates to highest historically observed energy
technology growth rates (around 20% per annum)
Iyer et al. [17]
Test 2: Comparison of the average annual additional
capacity (GW/year) to historical values for different
technologies (>50 GW/year for coal, 10–20 GW/year
for gas, nuclear and wind, <5 GW/year for solar over
the period 2000–2010, as shown in Section 5.2.2)
Van der Zwaan et al. [14]
Test 3: Analysis of duration of deployment for a
given level of installed capacity over the full
technology lifecycle (as discussed in Section 5.2.3)
Wilson et al. [23]
What is the pattern of
low-carbon technology
deployment?
Test 4: Assessment of how technology growth rates
compare to a logistic growth profile
(See Section 5.3.1)
Wilson et al. [23]
Test 5: Consideration of change in rate of growth of
primary energy resources once they reach a material
(~1%) share of primary energy (See Section 5.3.2)
Kramer and Haigh [21]
What is the rate of
transition between
primary energy
resources?
Test 6: Analysis of the overall energy transition in
terms of primary energy shares using a multiple
logistic substitution model. This type of model,
described in Appendix C, describes the growth,
saturation and decline of technologies over time as
new technologies compete with existing technologies
to take away their market share. (See Section 5.4)
Gruebler [20], Smil [11]
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4.2. Scenario Development and Rationale
The diagnostic tests set out in Table 3 are used to assess the real-world feasibility of low-carbon
scenarios, generated in the TIAM-Grantham integrated assessment model, in which global coordinated
mitigation action towards a 2 ◦C long-term temperature goal begins in 2020. Based on analysis by the
Met Office, a 50% chance of achieving 2 ◦C was modelled by applying a limit of 1340 GtCO2 to global
cumulative CO2 emitted from the fossil fuel combustion and industrial process sectors throughout the
21st century. As discussed in detail in Section 5, the application of these tests results in the formation
and analysis of three such mitigation scenarios:
• The first, named “2C_Original”, which does not have any specific technology growth constraints
on the low-carbon supply side energy technologies, whose deployment is therefore only limited
according to their relative cost. The only technology constraints are a limit on the share of total
electricity generation made up by wind, of 50%, and the share of total electricity generation made
up by total intermittent generation (mainly wind and solar) of 70%, to represent the increasing
difficulty of handling intermittent generation, and in the case of wind to limit this technology
from dominating, given the relatively low cost of onshore wind. These percentage limits are
somewhat arbitrary as there are no firm limits on intermittent renewables electricity generation
shares, particularly in the far future, with some scenarios modelling near-100% generation. This is
used as a starting point in order to first assess whether any technologies grow at a rate greater
than 20% per annum during any decadal periods between the year in which global mitigation
action begins (2020) and the end of the projection period (2100). This 20% threshold appears to be
at the higher end of technology growth rates as observed by Iyer et al. [17] (Test 1 in Table 3), and
although this rate has been exceeded (see for example Kramer and Haigh’s [21] assessment that
new primary energy sources have grown at 26% per annum in their early decades of development)
it is used as a relatively conservative threshold given that the low-carbon transition sees many
technologies growing simultaneously.
• The second, named “2C_Constrained”, which is created in order to constrain the growth rate of
key energy technologies which are observed to exceed the 20% limit as part of the “2C_Original”
scenario, therefore making them somewhat at odds with the historical sustained growth rates
observed by Iyer et al. [17] (Test 1 in Table 3). Such diffusion constraints are common in
optimisation models to prevent unrealistic growth or dominance of any one technology. Since
CCS is not yet deployed, a growth constraint is meaningless without first specifying what initial
level of deployment is allowed in each region—a “seed” value of 1 GW of CCS in each region is
therefore specified, reflecting that initial deployment is likely to see one or two large-scale CCS
plants of the order 0.5–1 GW (i.e., commercial scale) in each region.
• A third, named “2C_HighlyConstrained”, which is created in response to the application of all
of the tests listed in Table 3 to the “2C_Constrained” scenario, and consideration of whether
future low-carbon energy technology and energy resource patterns differ markedly from those
patterns observed in the past. In particular, and as explained in greater detail in Section 5: the
continued exponential growth of solar technologies beyond an initial growth phase is somewhat
at odds with the past trends observed by Kramer and Haigh [21] (Test 5 in Table 3); the extent of
wind deployment (in GW per EJ of total primary energy demand) in a given time duration, even
with growth rates limited to 20% per annum, is significantly greater than for some other energy
technologies as observed by Wilson et al. [23] (Test 3 in Table 3); and the rapidity of phase-out of
coal as a primary energy resource is somewhat at odds with past trends as observed by Smil [11]
and Gruebler [20] (Test 6 in Table 3).
For each of these scenarios, the implications of mitigation are assessed, in terms of the feasibility
(i.e., whether the TIAM-Grantham model can provide a solution) and cost. Table 4 summarises the
different features of the three scenarios. The third scenario, “2C_HighlyConstrained”, does not solve
for the specified cumulative CO2 limit of 1340 GtCO2. The budget was increased in increments
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(of 50 GtCO2) until an analytical solution was found—in this case the minimum budget that can be
achieved is 1540 GtCO2, which produces an estimated median warming of 2.1 ◦C rather than 2.0 ◦C
as per the 1340 GtCO2 budget. This estimate is made by Met Office Hadley Centre on the basis of a
simplifying assumption that the non-CO2 emissions and other climate forcing species are as per the
“2C_Original” 1340 GtCO2 scenario. The full methodology for this analysis is outlined in AVOID 2
report WPC2a [3]. Also shown in Table 4 are the constraints imposed in response to applying the
diagnostic tests listed in Table 3. These are explained in Section 5.
Table 4. Description of the scenarios compared in this study.
Scenario Details 2C_Original 2C_Constrained 2C_HighlyConstrained
21st century CO2 budget
(GtCO2) and 2100 median
temperature change
1340 (2.0 ◦C) 1340 (2.0 ◦C) 1540 (2.1 ◦C)
Mitigation action Global mitigation action from 2020, following weak regional action to 2020
Description 2
◦C scenario with action
delayed to 2020
Based on the
2C_Original scenario
with 20% annual growth
rate constraints applied
to some technologies
Based on the 2C_Constrained scenario with
additional strict constraints to avoid breech
of empirical rules
Constraint on supply side
energy technologies
Intermittent (mainly
wind and solar)
electricity generation
limited to 70% of total
electricity generation,
and wind to 50% of total
electricity generation
Intermittent electricity
generation constraints as
per 2C_Original; 20%
maximum growth on key
technologies which
exceed this in the
2C_Original scenario
(CCS, solar and wind)
Intermittent electricity generation
constraints as per 2C_Original; 20%
maximum growth rate for all CCS
technologies with a 1 GW seed; 20% growth
constraint on solar reduced to 4% after 2040;
5% growth constraint on wind; Minimum
capacity factor for unabated coal plants set
to 70% for new technologies and 50% for
existing technologies
5. Results from Application of Diagnostic Tests
5.1. Summary of Diagnostic Test Results as Applied to the Low-Carbon Scenarios
Table 5 summarises the outcomes of applying the six tests to the three scenarios. As is clear
from the table, the imposition of constraints on technology growth (and in the case of coal plants,
a minimum level for their operation) brings the future low-carbon energy technology and resource
transition patterns more closely into line with historical analogues as set out in the six tests described
in Section 4, and Sections 5.2–5.4.
Adding these multiple constraints does, however, compromise the TIAM-Grantham model’s
ability to solve for the stringent 1340 GtCO2 cumulative CO2 budget for the 21st century. Also of
note is the more rapidly rising carbon price as the scenarios become more constrained. There is no
contravention of Rogelj et al.’s [40] indicator of a CO2 price increase of greater than $1000/tCO2 per
decade in the period to 2050 (which is equivalent to an oil price increase of $270/bbl, and assumed
to be potentially economically disruptive), although this rate of increase is breached after 2070 in the
2C_HighlyConstrained scenario and after 2080 in the 2C_Constrained scenario. Countering this, it
should be noted that by 2070 world economic output is projected to be more than 4 times larger than
2015 levels, according to the underlying socio-economic assumptions used in this modelling exercise.
In terms of the impacts of the constraints on mitigation costs, the 2C_HighlyConstrained scenario
almost doubles mitigation costs compared to the unconstrained 2C_Original scenario. Nevertheless,
the costs still lie within recent ranges of mitigation cost estimates (for example the $12–120 trillion
cumulative discounted cost of meeting a 450 ppm CO2e atmospheric stabilisation level of greenhouse
gases reported in the 22nd Stanford Energy Modelling Forum exercise [41]).
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Table 5. Summary of outcomes from the diagnostic tests.
Test 2C_Original 2C_Constrained 2C_HighlyConstrained *
1 (growth rates) 20% maximum growth rateexceeded for some technologies 20% growth rate limit imposed 20% growth rate limit imposed
2 (capacity additions) -
Annual new capacity additions for solar and wind
significantly exceed historically observed capacity
additions as well as ranges observed in other IAM
model projections.
Annual new capacity additions for all
technologies are broadly in line with
historically observed capacity additions.
3 (extent of deployment in
given time) -
The fit of the extent-duration relationship of projected
technologies broadly matches the historical fit shown in
Wilson et al., except for wind where growth is too fast
Applying a growth limit of 5% per year
to wind brings it closer to the historically
observed extent-duration relationship.
4 (shape of
deployment time-profile) -
The deployment profile for technologies follows a logistic
growth shape with a slow ramp up from zero.
The deployment profile for technologies
follows a logistic growth shape with a
slow ramp up from zero.
5 (growth rate transition from
exponential to linear) -
Projections for solar do not transition to a period of linear
growth once materiality point (~1% of global primary
energy) is reached.
Future solar growth transitions to a
linear pattern once materiality reached.
6 (rate of coal phase-out) - The rate at which coal is phased out is significantly fasterthan those rates observed in historical energy transitions.
Coal phase-out is still rapid but much
slower than in the 2C_Original scenario.
Does the model solve? Yes Yes No. Solves for a minimum1540 GtCO2 budget.
CO2 price to 2100 (2005$/tCO2)
118 (2030)
310 (2050)
3595 (2100)
181 (2030)
480 (2050)
5512 (2100)
322 (2030)
850 (2050)
9790 (2100)
Cumulative CO2 captured in
BECCS to 2100 (GtCO2)
895 805 792
Cumulative mitigation cost
2012–2100 (2005$trillion),
(% of cumulative global GDP)
30.3
(1.0%)
44.2
(1.4%)
70.4
(2.2%)
Notes: Colours indicate degree of mismatch between modelled scenario projection and historical indicator—green represents a close match or more conservative future scenario, red a
mismatch whereby the future scenario is more challenging than the historical indicator, and amber an intermediate level of mismatch. * This is for the higher CO2 budget of 1540 Gt for the
period 2000–2100.
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In addition, this report focuses on feasibility through an assessment of rates of technology
deployment of supply side technologies. Other dimensions of feasibility such as energy efficiency rates
of improvement, negative emissions and stranded assets are not explicitly included here. However,
Table 5 does include a figure for total CO2 captured throughout the 21st century by bio-energy
with CCS (BECCS), given the importance of negative emissions technologies in meeting the 2 ◦C
goal. As discussed in Section 5.3.1, the total CO2 captured in these scenarios is within the range
of 2 ◦C-consistent scenarios within the IPCC’s fifth assessment report database, but significantly
higher than the AVOID 2 upper estimate of 476 GtCO2 based on consideration of global land use
constraints [42]. Whilst these limits are estimates, they nevertheless point towards the challenge posed
by reliance on negative emissions in all of the scenarios analysed in this study.
The following subsections describe in greater detail how the assessment in Table 5 has been
arrived at by considering each diagnostic test in turn.
5.2. How Rapidly Are Low Carbon Technologies Deployed?
5.2.1. Test 1: Assessing the Rates of Deployment of Low-Carbon Technologies
Table 6 shows the average annual growth rates (for each decade) in the 2C_Original scenario.
The growth rates for nuclear, hydro and oil power are all less than the historical maximum growth
rates for these technologies identified in Iyer et al. [17], which range from 7%–11% per year as shown
in Table 7. Wind grows at a rate of 37% per year in the decade immediately following the start of global
mitigation action (i.e., 2020–2030). In this decade, installed capacity of wind grows from 295 to over
6800 GW. To date, the highest average annual growth rates achieved for wind have been in Denmark at
around 20% per annum over the period 1977–2008, with global rates averaging 19% per year over the
period 2009–2013 [43]. CCS technologies show a rapid increase in the decade immediately after global
co-ordinated mitigation action begins. Around 330 GW of Biomass CCS and 230 GW of Gas CCS is
installed in this first decade, equivalent to an average annual growth rate of more than 70% (assuming
a starting seed of 1 GW is allowed in the year when CCS is first deployed). It should be noted that
this growth rate, stated with respect to a theoretical seed only, is not in itself infeasible. Nevertheless,
as shown in Figure 5, imposing a growth constraint does result in a more credible pattern of CCS
installed capacity growth.
In the 2C_Constrained scenario where CCS, solar and wind are constrained to a maximum growth
rate of 20%, wind hits this maximum in 2020–2030 and a more gradual decline in the growth rate
(compared to the 2C_Original scenario) is observed thereafter. As a result of the constraint on wind,
higher growth rates are observed for solar compared to the 2C_Original scenario, but these still do not
exceed 20% per year. For CCS technologies, although the sudden ramp up observed in the 2C_Original
scenario is prevented, a high growth rate of around 20% is sustained for three decades. It is important
to note that these assessments have been applied to only one model and so are not indicative of
technology growth rates in all mitigation scenarios. As such, a model inter-comparison would be
useful in elucidating the range of technology deployment rates across models.
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Table 6. Average annual growth rates by decade for the 2C_Original and 2C_Constrained scenarios.
Scenario Technology 2012–2020 2020–2030 2030–2040 2040–2050 2050–2060 2060–2070 2070–2080 2080–2090 2090–2100 Average
2C_Original
Biomass 5.4% −0.2% −5.3% - - - - - - -
Coal 0.1% −2.3% −10.1% - - - - - - -
Gas 0.0% −1.2% −9.5% - - - - - - -
Geothermal −0.6% 18.5% 2.6% 3.6% 5.8% 3.1% 5.5% 0.0% 0.0% 4.2%
Hydro 2.5% 0.6% 0.9% 1.9% 0.9% 1.2% 1.4% 2.3% 0.9% 1.4%
Nuclear 6.1% −0.8% 0.6% 2.8% 2.8% 1.7% 0.8% 0.5% 0.3% 1.5%
Oil −0.1% −4.5% −3.6% −3.0% 3.5% 3.5% 4.8% 2.4% 2.3% 0.5%
Solar 14.8% 3.2% 8.4% 3.2% 11.1% 5.3% 13.4% 4.6% 4.6% 7.4%
Wind 6.9% 37.0% 3.8% 2.6% 3.5% 4.2% 3.2% 2.4% 1.6% 6.8%
Biomass CCS - 78.6% * 12.4% 3.6% 0.9% 1.7% 2.5% 1.5% 0.8% 10.6%
Gas CCS - 72.1% * 8.8% 0.7% 2.8% 6.4% 3.4% −1.1% 3.3% 10.2%
2C_Constrained
Biomass 5.4% 8.9% −1.0% −3.0% −19.0% −24.4% −8.0% 8.3% 1.2% −4.4%
Coal 0.1% −2.3% −10.1% - - - - - - -
Gas 0.0% −1.2% −9.5% - - - - - - -
Geothermal −0.6% 20.1% 3.5% 7.7% 7.9% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.2%
Hydro 2.5% 0.7% 3.3% 1.2% 1.0% 0.9% 1.6% 1.2% 0.8% 1.4%
Nuclear 6.1% −0.8% 1.4% 3.4% 1.9% 1.3% 0.6% 0.5% 0.3% 1.5%
Oil 0.5% 10.6% −0.7% 0.0% −5.1% 2.1% 3.1% 5.0% 4.4% 2.2%
Solar 14.8% 4.7% 14.3% 18.8% 2.0% 2.2% 6.5% 5.0% 3.4% 7.6%
Wind 6.9% 20.0% 13.3% 5.4% 5.7% 4.7% 3.9% 1.6% 1.0% 6.8%
Biomass CCS - 27.2% *,ˆ 23.4% ˆ 18.4% 13.2% 5.4% 0.6% −0.2% 0.8% 10.6%
Gas CCS - 14.7% * 25.0% ˆ 18.9% 15.8% 5.6% 1.4% 1.9% 0.2% 10.1%
Key: <5% 5% to 10% 10% to 15% >15% - - - - - - - -
Notes: Growth rates are calculated as average annual rates over each decade, by comparing the start and end of each decade and assuming a uniform rate of exponential annual growth in
each decade. * For CCS technologies it was assumed that these technologies grow from a starting point of 1 GW of global capacity in the first decade. ˆ An initial growth rate of greater than
20% is observed for CCS technologies because the seed value is included in the maximum allowable growth rate. i.e., Capt < Capt−1(1 + r) + seed, where Capt is the capacity in year t,
Capt−1 is the capacity in year t− 1 and r is the growth rate. This results in an actual maximum growth rate of Capt/Capt−1 < (1 + r) + seed/Capt−1. Thus, this only has an impact during
the first decade when Capt−1 is small relative to the seed, thereafter the term seed/Capt−1 tends to zero.
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Table 7. Historical growth rates for established energy technologies [17].
Technology Geography Average Annual Growth Rate
Bioenergy Global 2%
Coal power Global 5%
Oil energy Global 7%
Natural gas power Global 7%
Hydropower Global <8%
Nuclear Global 11%
Wind Global 19% *
* Iyer et al. [17]—which does not state the period over which these growth rates occurred—only shows wind in
Denmark at 20% growth per annum (period 1977–2008). Thus, for fairness of comparison the figure shown in the
table is a global figure over the period 2009–2013 (from Global Wind Energy Council global statistics [43]).
5.2.2. Test 2: Comparing Future Technology Deployment Rates with Historical Rates
Figure 3 shows the comparisons of future average absolute capacity additions for low-carbon
energy technologies from Van der Zwaan et al. [14] as well as from the two constrained scenarios
(2C_Constrained and 2C_HighlyConstrained) using the TIAM-Grantham model for this study. All of
these scenarios represent global action towards a 2 ◦C target beginning in 2020, following a period of
weak regional climate policies to 2020.
The 2C_Constrained scenario has very rapid absolute wind GW growth rates over both the
2010–2030 and 2030–2050 periods—significantly higher than the median values from Van der Zwaan et
al., although broadly in line with the top-end values of about 110 GW per year in the period 2010–2030,
and 400 GW per year in the period 2030–2050. By contrast, the 2C_HighlyConstrained scenario, with a
much more stringent growth rate of 5% per annum on wind (as discussed in detail in Section 5.2.3) sees
much lower wind growth rates, on average 20 GW per year in the period 2010–2030 (which compares
closely to historical values) and 50 GW per year in the period 2030–2050.
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Figure 3. Average annual new installed capacity in the electricity sector (in GW/year) showing
(a) historical (2000–2010) data and future scenarios from a cross-model 450 ppm mitigation scenario
in the LIMITS project [14]; (b) TIAM-Grantham projections from the 2C_Constrained scenario and
(c) TIAM-Grantham projections from the 2C_HighlyConstrained scenario.
There is no clear indication of future scenario feasibility or infeasibility from this analysis, although
the lower growth rates observed in the 2C_HighlyConstrained scenario do match far more closely
the orders of magnitude observed for historical deployment rates (i.e., 50 GW per year for coal, the
dominant power generation technology historically). As discussed in the following Section 5.2.3,
overall energy system size is critical when considering the feasibility of future scenarios with reference
to the past.
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5.2.3. Test 3: Examining the Extent-Duration Relationship for Power Generation Technologies
In order to account for the fact that the energy system as a whole will be larger in the future,
which by extension will enable larger annual installed capacities of energy technologies than have
been observed historically, Wilson et al. [23] investigate the relationship between the “extent” of
technology deployment and the time taken to reach this extent. The extent K is the long-run saturation
level of the technology, expressed as maximum cumulative installed capacity (normalised for system
size by dividing capacity by total primary energy demand at the point where 50% of saturation is
reached). The duration ∆t is the time in years for the installed capacity to increase from 10% to 90% of K.
The values of K and ∆t are determined by fitting a logistic growth curve to the data for each technology.
Figure 4 shows the extent-duration relationship for the key low-carbon energy supply technologies
in the 2C_Constrained scenario, as well as for historical energy supply technology growth as collated
by Wilson et al. [23]. If all power generation technologies from the 2C_Constrained scenario are
included, then the trend line representing the extent-duration relationship across these technologies is
much less steep than that for historical power sector technology deployments, which implies that they
are not deployed as quickly as past technologies when normalising for the increasing energy system
size. If nuclear (an obvious outlier) is excluded, the trend line is much closer to the historical trend line.
The only technology above the extent-duration slope is wind. By imposing a 5% constraint on annual
wind growth (as is the case in the 2C_HighlyConstrained scenario), wind shifts to a higher duration
value such that it is more in line with this empirically derived extent-duration relationship (this is
represented by the orange cross in Figure 4). It is important to note that the small number of historical
data points in the power generation sector make these basic insights indicative only. However, this
analysis does highlight the importance of controlling for changes in the size of the energy system when
making historical comparisons.
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Figure 4. Global extent (Normalised K) vs. duration (∆t) relationship for low-carbon energy
technologies from the 2 _Constrained scenario, co pared to i t ic l t . Notes: Dotted line
represents the fit to the 2C_Constrained TIAM-Grantham projected scenario (including nuclear);
solid line represents the fit to the 2C_Constrained TIAM-Grantham projected scenario (excluding
nuclear); dashed line represents the fit to historical data (from Wilson et al. [23]). Open circles represent
historical data points from Wilson et al. [23]; closed square data points represent 2C_Constrained
TIAM-Grantham projected scenario; orange cross is the TIAM-Grantham projection for wind from the
2C_HighlyConstrained scenario.
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5.3. What Is the Pattern of Low-Carbon Technology Deployment?
5.3.1. Test 4: Fitting Logistic Growth Curves to Power Generation Technology Deployment Levels
Besides looking at average growth rates and absolute values of installed capacity, a key outcome
of the workshop described in Section 2 was that it is also important to consider the overall shape of
the deployment curve. In particular, new technologies are likely, in reality, to ramp up slowly in their
initial growth phase, as learning, supply chains, skills and expertise, finance, project management and
business models are all established. The logistic curve is a widely accepted representation of the overall
shape of the deployment curve. Using the approach outlined by Wilson et al. [23] (See Appendix C),
logistic curves have been fitted to each technology in both scenarios.
Figure 5 compares the 2C_Original and 2C_Constrained scenarios for both (a) Gas CCS and (b)
Biomass CCS, both of which see hundreds of GW deployed in the first decade (2020–2030) following
the start of global mitigation action. This figure shows the impact of the 20% growth constraint on
CCS technologies combined with a 1 GW seed value. This has the effect of lengthening the initial ‘tail’
during the early stages of the technology. Without this constraint in the 2C_Original scenario, a large
leap in installed capacity from zero in 2020 to 230–330 GW in 2030 is observed. In addition, a clear
levelling off is observed in the 2C_Constrained scenario as the technologies reach saturation, with gas
CCS and biomass CCS reaching an extent value of 2220 GW and 3096 GW by 2100, respectively. As a
result, the 2C_Constrained scenario represents an arguably more realistic deployment profile for these
technologies than in the 2C_Original scenario, which means that they more closely follow an S-curve
pattern as has been observed for a range of energy technologies to date [23,44].
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The viability of deploying biomass with CCS, as a critical technology to achieve a 2 °C-consistent 
cumulative limit to 21st century CO2 emissions, requires further consideration beyond purely 
analysing its deployment rate. In the 2C_Constrained scenario, the total captured and sequestered 
CO2 from bio-energy with CCS is 805 GtCO2, compared to a median value of 610 GtCO2 captured in 
the 2 °C scenarios in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report database. 
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Figure 5. Comparison of the deployment curves for the original and constrained scenarios showing
the fit with a logistic growth curve for (a) Gas CCS and (b) Biomass CCS.
The viability of deploying biomass with CCS, as a critical technology to achieve a 2 ◦C-consistent
cumulative limit to 21st century CO2 emissions, requires further consideration beyond purely analysing
its deployment rate. In the 2C_Constrained scenario, the total captured and sequestered CO2 from
bio-energy with CCS is 805 GtCO2, compared to a median value of 610 GtCO2 captured in the 2 ◦C
scenarios in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report database.
5.3.2. Test 5: Assessing Whether Future Technologies Break Kramer and Haigh’s Two Laws
Kramer and Haigh [21] also consider that it takes time for technologies to grow during the early
stages and that there is a limit to how fast this growth can occur, largely because “it takes time to build
the human and industrial capacity to achieve substantial deployment”. Based on analysis of historical
energy transitions (as shown in Figure 6), they propose two “laws” of technology development:
Energies 2017, 10, 116 19 of 36
1. Initially technologies go through a few decades of exponential growth, corresponding to a growth
rate of approximately 26% per annum, until they reach “materiality” (i.e., supplying around 1%
of the primary energy mix). Note that this appears to be faster than the fastest observed sustained
capacity additions of around 20% per year as appear in Iyer et al [17], which have been used to
constrain the technology capacity deployment rates in Section 5.2.1. Given that Iyer et al interpret
their collated historical rates of technology growth to produce an upper bound of a 15% per year
growth rate (which they deem high), we consider our 20% growth constraint to be a reasonable,
though potentially conservative, assumption.
2. Beyond this, growth slows to linear growth typically at around 2%–4% per annum.
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Figure 7 compares the growth of the total primary energy supply in the 2C_Constrained scenario 
and the 2C_HighlyConstrained scenario for three key technologies: (a) nuclear; (b) wind and (c) solar. 
Plotting total primary energy on a semi-log plot allows the transition between exponential and linear 
growth phases to be clearly observed. Figure 7a shows a short period of exponential growth for 
nuclear technology as it approaches materiality in the 1990s. This growth period conforms to the 
Kramer and Haigh [21] growth rate of 26% per annum. Once materiality is reached, nuclear 
transitions into a long period of linear growth, which continues out to 2100. This trend is observed 
for both the 2C_Constrained and the 2C_HighlyConstrained scenarios. In the 2C_Constrained 
scenario, Wind also shows a clear initial stage of exponential growth at 26% per annum as shown in 
Figure 7b. Soon after materiality is reached, wind transitions into a period of linear growth. The 
pattern observed for solar is shown in Figure 7c. Following a period of exponential growth at around 
26%, exponential growth continues but at a rate of around 7% per annum. This stage continues well 
beyond materiality and a period of linear growth is not observed before 2100.  
Figure 6. Historical and projected energy global resource usage [21]. Notes: Projections of total primary
energy supplied (in TJ per year) from Shell’s Blueprints scenario (with historical data provided to 2010).
Materiality band (shown in white) indicates an approximate level of 1% of global primary energy
supply for each resource. Historically, energy resources have been observed to transition from an
exponential growth path to a linear growth path once they have reached materiality.
Figure 7 compares the growth of the t t l er y supply in the 2C_Constrained scenario
and the 2C_HighlyConstrained scenario for t ree e tec ologies: (a) nuclear; (b) wind and (c) solar.
Plotting total primary energy on a semi-log plot allo s the transition between exponential and linear
growth phases to be clearly observed. Figure 7a shows a short period of exponential growth for
nuclear technology as it approaches materiality in the 1990s. This growth period conforms to the
Kramer and Haigh [21] growth rate of 26% per annum. Once materiality is reached, nuclear transitions
into a long period of linear growth, which continues out to 2100. This trend is observed for both the
2C_Constrained and the 2C_HighlyConstrained scenarios. In the 2C_Constrained scenario, Wind also
shows a clear initial stage of exponential growth at 26% per annum as shown in Figure 7b. Soon after
materiality is reached, wind transitions into a period of linear growth. The pattern observed for solar
is shown in Figure 7c. Following a period of exponential growth at around 26%, exponential growth
continues but at a rate of around 7% per annum. This stage continues well beyond materiality and a
period of linear growth is not observed before 2100.
The more stringent constraints imposed in the 2C_HighlyConstrained scenario (specifically a 5%
per annum annual growth limit on wind, and a 4% annual growth limit on solar after 2040) result
in growth rates of these energy resources which are more in line with the laws outlined by Kramer
and Haigh [21]. As shown in Figure 7b, in the 2C_HighlyConstrained scenario, wind growth slows
once materiality has been reached and it transitions to a period of linear growth soon after. Similarly,
Figure 7c shows that with a 4% growth rate imposed on solar after 2040 (the maximum rate in the
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range of Kramer and Haigh’s [21] post-materiality phase), solar also transitions to a period of linear
growth soon after materiality is reached. Note that, in the 2C_HighlyConstrained scenario, solar PV
has more of a role to play because of other constraints imposed (principally on wind) to go from
constrained to highly constrained.Energies 2017, 10, x  20 of 36 
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Notes: Historical data was estimated from Kramer and Haigh [21]. Future numbers are taken from 
the TIAM-Grantham scenario projections. Primary energy supply for renewables and nuclear is taken 
as actual electricity generated.  
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5.4. What Is the Rate of Transition between Primary Energy Resources?
Test 6: Assessing the Time Taken for Primary Energy Resource Shares to Rise and Fall
Figure 8a shows the share of total primary energy by fuel for the 2C_Constrained scenario.
The data points indicate actual data from the model projections and the solid lines represent a fit to
this data using a multiple logistic substitution model following the method outlined by Wilson and
Gruebler [45]. Most noticeable is the speed at which coal is replaced with other energy sources. In the
2C_Constrained scenario a reduction in unabated coal from around 30% to less than 5% of global
primary energy is observed in just one decade. Some of this is owing to coal being replaced with gas.
Gas increases from 25% to 44% in the same time period. Much of the unabated coal is phased out, to
be replaced with CCS technology which rises to around 30% by 2060. Unabated gas and oil are slowly
phased out over the century to be ultimately replaced by renewables and nuclear. Biomass without
CCS also declines in favour of BECCS technology.
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As a result of the extremely rapid phase-out of coal, a minimum utilisation constraint has been
placed on unabated coal-fired power stations, as explained in Section 4. This sees newly constructed
coal plants maintai a 70% minimum capa ity factor, an existing plants a 50% factor. As a result, the
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decline of unabated coal is slower, occurring over 4 decades as opposed to just one decade as per the
2C_Original scenario.
Table 8 shows the time ∆t for each energy resource to increase from 10% to 90% of total primary
energy share, for the projected scenarios and also for historical energy transitions (from Gruebler [20]).
The ∆t values for the phasing out of gas, oil and biomass and for the phasing in of renewables and
nuclear are sufficiently long to not be considered infeasible given historical energy transitions. An
exception is the decline phase for coal in the 2C_Constrained scenario, which is only 17 years. By forcing
coal plants to remain online with a relatively high capacity factor, as in the 2C_HighlyConstrained
scenario, this is increased to 34 years—still clearly challenging given the rather longer ∆t periods for
historical transitions. The ∆t for CCS of 44–77 years is also short compared to historical global values,
which highlights the challenge of deploying CCS when viewed from this perspective.
Table 8. Values of ∆t in years for historical transitions [20] and TIAM-Grantham projections.
Scenario Technology Region Growth ∆t(in Years)
Decline ∆t
(in Years)
Historical
Biomass (traditional) Global - −130
Coal Global 130 −80
Modern fuels (oil, gas, electricity) Global 90 -
2C_Constrained
Unabated coal Global - −17
Biomass (without CCS) Global - −202
Unabated gas and oil Global - −127
CCS (all) Global 77 −152
Renewables and nuclear Global 116 -
2C_HighlyConstrained
Unabated coal Global - −34
Biomass (without CCS) Global - −209
Unabated gas and oil Global - −147
CCS (all) Global 42 −440
Renewables and nuclear Global 200 -
6. Implications and Conclusions
Historical energy transitions, at both the energy resource and energy technology levels, provide
potentially useful insights to inform the plausibility of future low-carbon scenarios. Over recent years
a body of literature has emerged which seeks to compare future low-carbon scenarios with patterns
and trends of energy transitions from history, in order to gain insights into the level of challenge posed
by these futures. This study, drawing from and building on this literature, as well as the views of
experts in the fields of energy systems modelling and energy transitions, applies a set of diagnostic
tests to a selected low-carbon scenario aimed at achieving a 2 ◦C limit to global warming by 2100, in
order to assess how its energy technology and primary energy resource patterns compare with history.
By applying growth and other technology constraints to this scenario in response to these
diagnostics, two further low-carbon scenarios are created—the first with key energy supply technology
growth rates constrained to 20% per annum, reflecting the higher end of previous energy and pollution
control technology growth rates, and the second with additional growth constraints to wind and
solar, as well as the specification of a minimum usage level of unabated coal generation plants. The
second scenario, with its range of constraints, shows future primary energy and energy technology
transition patterns which match historical experience reasonably well. However, with these constraints
the energy systems model used to produce the low-carbon scenarios can no longer solve, indicating
that the constraints are possibly too binding to allow the realisation of a 2 ◦C target to be met with
50% likelihood. The minimum median 2100 temperature change that can be reached is about 2.1 ◦C,
although at more than twice the cumulative cost of the unconstrained scenario.
Whilst these tests produce valuable insights into the challenges to be overcome in achieving
a low-carbon transition, a number of caveats to the analysis must be highlighted, which provide
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avenues for further research. The first is that the analysis of historical transition rates can only be a
rough guide to the future, since there can be (and have been) very rapid short-term growth rates in
individual technologies and energy resources in specific regions. Although various barriers to the
uptake of technologies exist, as listed in Section 2.3, there is no fundamental reason (e.g., a physical
resource limitation) why such rapid growth cannot be reproduced at larger scales and longer time
periods with sufficient effort from governments, businesses and other stakeholders to overcome these
barriers. The second is that a number of contextual factors are not captured in the energy systems
models such as the TIAM-Grantham model used in this analysis—these models can only directly
represent technological (and in some cases and to a limited extent) economic systems, not social or
political systems. Such factors will be critical to determining the real-world drivers and barriers to
future energy transitions. Hence, comparing the future projected scenarios with past trends overlooks
a number of elements which could make the future context in which a low-carbon transition occurs
very different from past circumstances which have driven historical transitions. Thirdly, the analysis,
in building on recent literature, focuses only on the energy supply side. Clearly future mitigation
feasibility will also depend heavily on energy efficiency improvements and the rate of penetration
of low-carbon energy demand technologies into the major end-use sectors (transport, buildings and
industrial manufacturing). Further analysis should include the assessment of demand side technology
transitions. Finally, it is also necessary to consider the physical supply limits to key low-carbon energy
technologies. In many cases (as with TIAM-Grantham) the integrated assessment models contain
such limits, for example on total available fossil, uranium, wind and other resources. However, a
more explicit framing of low-carbon transition assessments in the context of all potential constraints
(including skills, essential rare earth elements, land, water and other resources) is an emerging field.
These caveats aside, what is clear from this analysis is that low-carbon transitions will require rates
of energy supply technology deployment and rates of declines in fossil fuels which are unprecedented,
if the 2 ◦C goal is to be achieved.
Supplementary Materials: Responses to the post-workshop questionnaire are provided as supplementary
material. These are available online at www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/10/1/116/s1.
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Appendix A. Note on the AVOID 2 Energy Transitions Workshop
(16 October 2014, Imperial College London)
Appendix A.1 Session 1 Discussion Points:
• Speed of technology take-up depends on the technology in question:
# For example, CCS is a bulky, complex technology, which involves new infrastructure,
project management, business models and significant financing.
# By contrast, solar PV is modular, can be deployed at small-scale and can be less capital
intensive.
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# Electric vehicles require only a change in drivetrain to existing car designs. This, combined
with relatively short vehicle lifetimes, means that rapid take-up rates of EVs are plausible.
12% of new cars sold in Norway are EVs, incentivised by subsidies and other softer
measures such as access to bus lanes, higher purchase taxes on conventional vehicles
(i.e., very targeted policies to affect purchase behaviours)
# However, unless the grid is highly decarbonised, such as that in Norway, the well to wheel
emissions for electric cars are similar to those of efficient internal combustion vehicles
(this would be the case for the UK). Consequently, for there to be significant benefit in a
rapid uptake of electric vehicles, over and above a stringent emissions standard for IC
engine cars, not only would the grid need to have significantly more capacity, but it would
need to be very low carbon.
• Speed of technology take-up depends on the tail before rapid take-off:
# Solar PV has had a very long tail of development and deployment leading to the recent
significant increase in cumulative capacity. The same is true of wind.
• Success of a technology also depends on whether it can have benefits beyond just carbon reductions:
# These might be for example whether it can gain a wide variety of new applications (as with
General Purpose Technologies such as the steam engine, though in practice it is not possible
to tell in advance which technologies or combinations of technologies will become GPTs)
# Alternatively, it may have significant co-benefits (e.g., reduced air pollution, energy
security) which make it attractive from a private/national perspective in the earlier stages
of deployment, without considering its global social (climate) benefit.
• Businesses’ considerations will be critical in determining technology take-up rates:
# Businesses (e.g., refining) consider the time it takes to deploy technologies as well as the
potential for cost reductions as technologies get deployed.
# In addition, rates of return for investment in new technologies are technology- and
region-specific, reflecting these context-specific investment risks. The key to many business
investment decisions is not so much technology-specific hurdle rates, but the forgone
returns from alternative investments.
# The response of business is itself cultural specific. Anglo-Saxon nations tend towards
high discount rates and legal frameworks that favour share-holder return. There are
significantly different models in other parts of the world; for example share-ownership
and short-termism are less dominant in Germany.
# Businesses also operate within a legal framework, so the use of emissions standards
and other forms of regulation can rapidly change the business environment (though it
is probably wise that politicians refrain from picking technology winners, and instead
simply set the regulatory and emission standard framework within which industry must
deliver/operate.
• Technology take-up rates cannot be considered outside of the social and political context:
# We are deeply locked-in to the technologies, institutions and norms of a fossil fuel
energy system.
# Any radical replacement of fossil technologies will see significant destabilisation of this
status quo.
# There needs to be a process of path creation for new and existing players in the energy
system, in order to provide a transition path to a low-carbon system. An example of
context-specific conditions is the rapid switch from town to natural gas (an established
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industry already looking for new opportunities, the specific era of governance with firms
working closely with government) which saw very high levels of stranded assets but
nonetheless succeeded.
# Particular policies which drive forward the technologies will be critical.
# End-use technologies have very rapid turnover rates (typically less than 10 years for cars,
fridges, toasters etc.) and are therefore an exception to the issue of ‘lock-in’. Emission
standards here could see very rapid transitions away from current levels of fossil fuel
consumption—provided rebound issues were addressed.
• The “marginal economics” nature of energy-technology models may limit their usefulness in
projecting fundamental energy system and energy demand changes.
Appendix A.2 Session 2 Discussion Points
• We are rapidly consuming our available carbon budget for the 21st century.
• A view was given that we cannot build low-carbon technology supply fast enough to make
a significant impact on the current rate of emissions growth for many years to come, which
highlights the importance of demand reduction.
• Consideration of requisite rates of decarbonisation needs to be clear about the probability of
remaining below 2C.
• Requisite rates should not account for negative emissions technologies in all scenarios—exploring
scenarios with and without negative emissions is better.
# However, if models represent bioenergy and CCS, then why not BECCS—perhaps better
to consider limiting bioenergy and/or CCS as well/instead.
# One opposing argument is that there are a number of low-carbon technologies vying for
bioenergy and the availability of biomass across all technologies needs to be considered.
• Energy demand reduction provides a feasible opportunity to make significant emissions cuts in
the short term, but needs very effective policies.
# Example given of setting effective vehicle emission standards which could reduce
emissions (considering turnover rates and some early scrappage) by 50% in 10 years.
• Should be more explicit consideration and explanation of underlying economic growth pathways
that relate to each mitigation scenario
# The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) work is beginning to address this point, since
to date the socio-economic storyline for each Representative Concentration Pathway has
been different, but the SSP initiative will allow matching of RCPs to different SSPs.
• Feasibility of decarbonisation rates cannot be considered without first considering what can be
achieved in each sector by each technology, measure and policy.
• Many integrated assessment models do not have detailed representations of energy end-use
technologies, and none have detailed representations of energy usage behaviour and detailed
take-up patterns for end-use technologies. These limitations should be carefully considered in
low-carbon scenarios.
• Low cost or even cost-saving energy demand reduction measures can help buy time for the
implementation of low-carbon technologies. In addition, demand side is just as important as
supply to energy security.
• With TIAM, which does have representation of energy demand technologies, it would be
worthwhile considering what would happen in optimal scenarios when all cost-saving efficiencies
are taken up, and in other scenarios where behaviour is not “optimal” in this narrow
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economic sense. A key question is defining how far real-world behaviour would deviate from
this cost-optimality.
• Integrated assessment models mostly do not consider feedbacks from future energy systems to
economic systems (other than through a marginal demand response as the price of energy rises
with increased low-carbon technology share). In general no climate feedback to the economy’s
output is modelled (although some projects are beginning to look at this—HELIX being one).
• It is worthwhile considering the impact of removing key technologies (not just BECCS) from the
portfolio to assess feasibility and cost of low-carbon scenarios.
Appendix A.3 Session 3 Discussion Points
Summary of discussion on wind and solar deployment feasibility:
• Barriers:
# Wind at scale will require a lot bulkier capital investments;
# Wind not viable at small (household) scale and will face land constraints;
# Wind technology more mature, less room for cost reduction;
# Grid connections to wind could be a constraint;
# For solar, possible supply chain and material constraints need to be considered;
# Centralised generators do not favour decentralised technologies like solar.
• Overcoming barriers:
# Weather-based energy pricing to support solar and wind intermittency;
# Appliance design could be modified to handle intermittent generation;
# Smart systems with storage (e.g., from EVs & domestic thermal storage) would also help
enable solar and wind;
# Specific policies have been successful in nurturing these technologies to rapid growth;
• Overall, none of the models’ rates of technology growth seem fundamentally infeasible, and solar
in particular could grow faster, sooner.
Summary of discussion on energy intensity:
• Large variations in base year figures noted between different models.
• Difficult to unpick what causes energy intensity reductions in each sector:
# How much is structural (e.g., shift to less energy-intensive industry);
# How much is technological (e.g., shift form ICE to EVs in transport);
# How much is demand reduction (e.g., travel less by car, switch lights off more frequently).
• Energy intensity is not a factor in itself to constrain, but the underlying factors need greater analysis.
• Overall, none of the rates of intensity improvements looked particularly infeasible, but need to
understand the underlying drivers to assess this more thoroughly. e.g., electrification of end-use
sectors could see significant energy efficiency savings, but need to consider what is driving
electrification and how effective this driver is.
Summary of discussion on nuclear and CCS:
• Cannot consider the ramp-up rate of each technology by region in isolation, as supply chain
capacity for a given technology can be considered a global resource, while the development
of capacity (e.g., training engineers) in a given region probably implies trade-offs between
technologies’ growth rates. Therefore need to consider what other technologies are being invested
in globally and regionally, as these will compete for construction, skills, finance etc.
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• Scenarios do not consider small nuclear reactors—just GW-scale.
• Overall, rapid post-2030 ramp-ups of nuclear and CCS look unrealistic unless there has been
significant tooling up, investment in skills and infrastructure. Lead times for capital-intensive
technologies such as this will be several years, potentially a decade—this must be accounted for.
• LCA (life-cycle assessment) carbon emissions for CCS are likely to be above 80 g CO2/kWh—and
possibly much higher (unless technologies change and upstream capture of fugitive emissions is
achieved). This places the LCA emissions of CCS at 4 to 20 times greater than the LCA carbon
emissions for renewables and nuclear technologies. As a consequence, with more electrification
the relative role of CCS in the power systems of Annex I countries is highly constrained by the
available carbon budgets. So CCS is a viable transition technology for non-Annex I countries but
much less so for Annex I countries.
Final discussion points:
• Modelling of this nature is not about predicting the future but more about identifying technology
possibilities before considering how to support these technologies.
• Modelling develops heuristics—it helps us understand the system; the actual results need to be
treated with considerable caution and continually sense checked.
• A number of considerations should be brought to bear when considering scenario feasibility:
# Technology costs and how these could develop with deployment (noting the considerable
uncertainties around future costs);
# Technology co-benefits;
# Supply chain and material constraints;
# Trade-offs between technologies considering competition for skills, capital;
# Supporting technologies;
# Initial “tail” of deployment, including long lead-times for capital-intensive projects like
CCS and nuclear;
# Policy effectiveness;
# Socio-political context accounting for lock-in to a fossil energy system.
• The demand side technologies, measures and policies are critical in achieving rapid emissions
reductions, in many cases at low or negative costs, so should be considered more thoroughly.
• Important that models do not all “revert to a mean” so that there are no outliers—this may
preclude important possible patterns of technology deployment (e.g., one technology showing
significant dominance eventually). Against this, the massive increase in electricity generation as
end-use sectors become electrified will probably require several different electricity generation
technologies to be deployed.
Appendix B. Post-Workshop Questionnaire on Understanding the Feasibility of Energy System
Transitions in Energy Technology Models
This appendix presents the post-workshop questionnaire which was sent out to workshop
attendees. Detailed responses to the questionnaire are provided in the supplementary material.
Introduction
This questionnaire is a follow-up to the discussion at the AVOID 2 energy transitions workshop
held at Imperial College on 16 October 2014. It consists of nine questions in four different sections.
Responses, in addition to notes from the workshop, will be used in forming views on mitigation
scenarios developed in the AVOID 2 work programme. Responses may also form the basis of published
analysis on energy and climate experts’ views on energy transition feasibility. Please note that all
responses will remain anonymised in any published reports.
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Please enter your name here: ________________________________
Level of knowledge in energy and technology transitions
1. Please state your level of expertise in energy transitions research (High, Medium, Low)
2. Please state your level of expertise in energy modelling (High, Medium, Low)
General views on how to critically assess technology take-up rates
3. At the AVOID 2 workshop on energy transitions, a number of factors were discussed as potentially
important in considering the real-world feasibility of different technology take-up rates. Which
four of these factors are most critical (ranked 1: most critical, to 4) when undertaking a feasibility
assessment of technology take-up rates?
a. Degree to which there has been a ramp-up “tail” period before rapid deployment
b. Co-benefits of the technology beyond low-carbon
c. Cost reduction potential of technology
d. Lead-time to build and deploy technology
e. Availability of complementary or supporting technologies/infrastructure
f. Deployment of other low-carbon technologies which compete for resources
g. Capital-intensiveness of technology
h. Lifetime of technology
4. On a scale of 1 (not at all useful) to 5 (very useful), how useful is it to consider (either in absolute
terms, as % growth rates, or as shares of total technology capacity) the historical take-up rates of
energy technologies when assessing the feasibility of particular low-carbon energy technology
take-up rates in future mitigation scenarios? Please explain your answer.
5. In addition to factors (a–h) in question 1 above, as well as historical take-up rates of energy
technologies, are there any other factors which should be considered when assessing the feasibility
of technology take-up rates in mitigation scenarios?
General views on how to critically assess energy system changes in energy technology models
6. Thinking beyond specific technology take-up rates and to broader energy systems, how useful
(on a scale of 1: not at all useful, to 5: very useful) are the following methods to assess the
feasibility of achieving future mitigation scenarios?
• Some analysis has considered the time taken for different energy sources to attain particular
shares of total primary energy supply (either globally or regionally), as a guide to how
rapidly low-carbon energy sources might attain given shares in the future.
• There has been some assessment of feasibility based on whether the mitigation scenarios
involve a rapid increase in carbon prices over a short time period.
• Feasibility assessment has also considered whether absolute carbon prices reach particularly
high levels.
7. Which other metrics could be useful in assessing the feasibility of achieving future energy systems
in mitigation scenarios?
Views on specific technology take-up rates
8. The following figures show the cumulative capacity deployed in different regions, using different
energy-technology models, in the Ampere study (one of the major inter-model comparison
projects to be included in the IPCC’s fifth assessment report). Underneath each figure the average
annual growth rate over the period 2030–2050 is given (except for CCS, which is 2040–2050, since
in many models no CCS is deployed by 2030). The particular scenario details are:
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• “weak” country/region action in line with the lower (less ambitious) end of Cancun pledges
to 2030, followed by global mitigation action aimed at achieving a 450 ppm concentration
of GHGs;
• no specific details on technology R&D and planning before global mitigation action begins,
though it may reasonably be assumed that current policies and R&D and demonstration
programmes (e.g., for CCS) continue.
Please say, for each of the following technologies, which deployment rates (if any) look unrealistic and
why, considering both World and Regional deployment patterns.
a. Nuclear (Figure B1);
b. Solar PV (Figure B2);
c. Wind (Figure B3);
d. CCS for gas and coal combined (Figure B4).
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Figure B1. Inter-model comparison of installed capacity (GW) for nuclear in (a) World (2030–2050
growth rate = 4%–12% p.a.); (b) China (2030–2050 growth rate = 4%–12% p.a.); (c) The EU (2030–2050
growth rate = 3%–13% p.a.); (d) India (2030–2050 growth rate = 5%–13% p.a.) and (e) USA (2030–2050
growth rate = 3%–6% p.a.).
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Figure B2. Inter-model comparison of installed capacity (GW) for solar PV in (a) World (2030–2050
growth rate = 8%–22% p.a.); (b) China (2030–2050 growth rate = 13%–35% p.a.); (c) The EU (2030–2050
growth rate = 4%–10% p.a.); (d) India (2030–2050 growth rate = 15%–22% p.a.) and (e) USA (2030–2050
growth rate = 3%–30% p.a.)
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Figure B3. Inter-model comparison of installed capacity (GW) for wind (offshore and onshore) in
(a) World (2030–2050 growth rate = 5%–10% p.a.); (b) China (2030–2050 growth rate = 5%–13% p.a.);
(c) The EU (2030–2050 growth rate = 4%–10% p.a.); (d) India (2030–2050 growth rate = 0–10% p.a.) and
(e) USA (2030–2050 growth rate = 4%–8% p.a.).
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Figure B4. Inter-model comparison of installed capacity (GW) for coal and gas CC in (a) World
(2030–2050 growth rate = 7%–17% p.a.); (b) China (2030–2050 growth rate = 0–15% p.a.); (c) The EU
(2030–2050 growth rate = 6%–15% p.a.); (d) India (2030–2050 growth rate = 6%–22% p.a.) and (e) USA
(2030–2050 growth rate = 6%–18% p.a.).
9. Figure B5 shows the change in energy intensity in the transport sector in different models from
the Ampere study, in:
a. a baseline scenario;
b. a 450ppm scenario with immediate action (starting in 2010) and;
c. a 450ppm scenario with immediate action and higher energy in ensity improvements.
Please say which energy intensity rates of change (if any) look unrealistic and why, considering both
World and Regional deployment patterns.
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Figure B5. Inter-model comparison of the change in energy intensity in the transport sector in  
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Appendix C. Logistic Growth
Appendix C.1 The Generalised S-Shaped Growth Model
This is a summary f the approach outlin d by Wilson et al. [23] in heir tudy. The curve used to
describe the growth of technologies is a three parameter logistic function as follows:
y =
K(
1 + e−b(t−t0)
)
and ∆t =
1
b
log 81
where K is the asymptote indicating the saturation level, b is the diffusion rate or steepness of the
curve, ∆t is the time period over which y grows from 10% to 90% of K, and t0 is the inflection point at
the point of maximum growth i.e., at K/2. As highlighted by Wilson et al. [23], this is a recognised
approach which is well-documented in the literature. The data of cumulative installed capacity of
technologies from the model runs were fitted to this logistic function using a least sum of the squares
fit in order to determine the values of the constants. In order to control for the fact that the size
of the energy system may vary during the period over which the technology is diffused and that a
larger energy system results in larger absolute value of K, normalised values of K were calculated.
The primary energy consumption values taken at the inflection point of the logistic function were used
as the normalising factor. Note that normalised K has units of MW/EJ and is therefore not meaningful
in absolute terms.
Appendix C.2 Multiple Logistic Substitution
The method used in this paper is based on that outlined in [45]. Two good resources explaining
the Logistic Substitution approach which were also consulted are [46]. Logistic substitution models
(LSM) describe the growth, saturation and decline of competing products and the substitution of one
product for another. The main assumptions of the model are:
• Growth of new technologies occurs at logistic rates.
• Only one technology saturates the market at any given time.
• There is a non-logistic phase which connects the period of growth to its subsequent period
of decline.
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• Declining technologies fade away steadily at logistic rates uninfluenced by competition by
new technologies.
In order to fit the energy data to the LSM the following steps were carried out:
1. The raw data dij was converted into fractional shares Frij of the market (where i is the technology
and j is the year).
Frij =
dij
∑nk=1 dkj
2. These fractional shares were then transformed using the Fisher-Pry transform. This converts the
S-shaped logistic growth into a straight line when plotted on a semi-log graph.
FRij =
Frij
1− Frij
3. The substitution curves L1, L2, . . . , Ln correspond to the fractional market shares Fr1, Fr2, . . . , Frn
and cover all three of the substitution phases: logistic growth, non-logistic growth and
logistic decline.
4. By fitting a straight line to the growth and decline (if present) phases of each technology the
parameters for each curve Li were estimated: ∆ti (the characteristic growth time of technology i)
and tmi (the midpoint of growth/decline for technology i).
ln
Li
1− Li = −
ln 81
∆ti
(t− tmi)
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